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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the Estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
Case No. 880034
vs
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction

lies with this Court pursuant

to Rule 35,

U.R.A.P. The opinion of the Utah Supreme Court which gives rise to
this Petition for Rehearing was filed on June 28, 1991.

On July

10, 1991, pursuant to Fire Insurance Exchange's Rule 22(b) and (c),
U.R.A.P., Motion for Extension of Time for Filing Petition for
Rehearing, this Court ordered that Fire Insurance Exchange had
until July 26, 1991, to file its Petition for Rehearing.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
On remand to the trial court, is Fire Insurance Exchange
entitled to a trial by jury on the issue of punitive damages?

1

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and Article I, Sections 7 and 10 of the Utah Constitution are
deemed determinative of this Petition for Rehearing.

Due to the

length of these provisions, the text of each is set forth fully in
the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Petition

for Rehearing

is brought

to seek

further

consideration and clarification from this Court of certain issues
decided in this Courtfs published opinion in Crookston, et al. v.
Fire Ins. Exchange, Docket No. 880034, dated

June

28, 1991

(hereinafter "Crookston").
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Court's opinion in Crookston, and the briefs previously
filed by plaintiffs/appellees and defendant/appellant contain a
full statement of the pertinent facts on appeal.
Subsequent

to

the

issuance

of

this

Court's

opinion

in

Crookston, Fire Insurance Exchange has tendered to plaintiffs the
sum of $1,489,26 3.14, in full and complete satisfaction of the
compensatory damages, attorneys1 fees, and costs awarded at the
trial level and affirmed on appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court's opinion in Crookston correctly notes that the
jury's award of $4.0 million in punitive damages exceeds the
"bounds of the general pattern" of prior punitive damage awards in

2

the state of Utah, and was the result of a "highly problematic",
"incomprehensively

vague and unintelligible", and

standardless" formula for awarding such damages.

"essentially

In vacating the

trial courtfs denial of Fire Insurance Exchange's motion for new
trial or remittitur on the basis of an excessive award of punitive
damages and remanding the case for "further consideration" in light
of the Courtfs opinion, this Court failed to require that the issue
of punitive damages be retried under the standards and procedures
adopted in Crookston. Notions of due process and right to a trial
by jury require this Court to order the retrial of the issue of
punitive damages before a jury.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE ORIGINAL $4.0 MILLION PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AWARD
RESULTED
FROM
THE
TRIAL
JURY'S
ESSENTIALLY STANDARDLESS DISCRETION.
This Court in Crookston acknowledges that the unprecedented
$4.0 million punitive damage award in this case "exceeds the
general pattern" established in prior Utah cases.

Id. at 25. In

Crookston, this Court also notes that the juryfs award may have
been the result of the jury's "essentially standardless discretion"
in assessing the amount of damages awardable against Fire Insurance
Exchange.

Id. at 27. In vacating the trial court!s order denying

Fire Insurance Exchange's motion for new trial or remittitur on the
issue

of

punitive

observations

as

to

damages,

this

Court

the deficiencies
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made

in the

the

following

punitive

damage

"standard" utilized by the trial jury in the first instance in this
case:
"[A] review of our case law and punitive damages
has left us dissatisfied with articulated standards
for determining the amount of such awards." Id. at
25.
"These standards provide little guidance for . . .
a jury fixing the punitive damages . . .." Id.
"The stated list of factors we have said must be
considered in assessing the amount of punitives to
be awarded include the following . . . . Our cases
have done little more than list these factors. No
relative weights have been assigned them, and no
standards or formulas have been established for
properly evaluating them when making an award or
when reviewing the propensity of a jury award.
This makes such an enterprise highly problematic
for judge and jury.
The finder of fact has no
guidance on how much weight to give each factor or
even how the factors should be assessed.
And
nothing suggests to the jury or the trial court
that there is any sort of limit or ceiling on an
award." Id. at 26.
ff

[Q]uite predictably, the bases for awards made in
those jurisdictions [utilizing similar lists of
factors] are no more fathomable than ours.
The
problem that results from this lack of guidance to
juries . . . is exemplified by disparate ratios of
punitive to actual damages . . .." Id.
[T]he standard by which the jury is to gauge the
amount of punitive damages, if any, that it is to
award is incomprehensibly vague and unintelligible
. . .." IcL at 27 (quoting Charter Hospital of
Mobile, Inc. v. Weinberg, 558 So.2d 909, 916-17
(Ala. 1990)).
"Many states have recognized the problems created
by giving finders of fact essentially standardless
discretion to award punitive damages . . .." Id.
at 27.
The obvious deficiencies

in the standards

for assessing

punitive damages utilized by the trial jury in this case compelled
4

this Court to "craft" a set of new guidelines for awarding punitive
damages.

1x3. at 25.

In adopting such guidelines, this Court

adopted a "middle ground" approach, rather than continuing to rely
solely on the traditional "list-of-factors standard."
The new standards mandated
additional

emphasis

or

IcL at 28.

by this Court in Crookston place

clarification

on

the

"reasonable and

rational" relationship requirement between a punitive damage award
and the actual "hard compensatory" damages. Id. at 29; 31-32 at n.
29. This Court then articulated the following general standard to
enable juries, trial courts, and appellate courts to know what is
mandated

under

the

"reasonable

and

rational

relationship"

requirement:
Generally, we have found punitive damage
awards below $100,000 not to be excessive only
when the punitives do not exceed actual
damages by more than a ratio of approximately
3-to-l. (Citations omitted)
Because of the limited number of cases
considering large awards, it is more difficult
to note a particular pattern once the award
exceeds approximately $100,000. However, it
is safe to say that these large awards appear
to receive more scrutiny than the smaller
awards and that the acceptable ratio appears
lower. (Citations omitted)
The general rule to be drawn from our past
cases appears to be that where the punitives
are well below $100,000, punitive damage
awards beyond a 3-to-l ratio to actual damages
have seldom been upheld and that where the
award is in excess of $100,000, we have
indicated some inclination to overturn awards
having ratios of less than 3-to-l.
Id. at 29-30.
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In this case, the jury found $815,266 in compensatory damages,
of which $323,399 represented "hard compensatory" damages.

As a

result, the jury's award of $4.0 million in punitive damages bears
a more than 12-to-l ratio to the Crookstonsf

"hard" damages,

thereby clearly exceeding the "bounds of the general pattern" of
punitive damage awards in the state of Utah.

Not only does the

ratio of punitive to actual damages in this case exceed the
"general pattern," but the sheer size of the award, $4.0 million,
is eight times the next highest published punitive damage award in
the state of Utah.

See Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P. 2d 766 (Utah

1985) ($500,000 award).

Such a significant departure from the

"bounds of the general pattern," suggests strongly that a trial
jury, if instructed in light of this Court's opinion in Crookston,
would probably render a punitive damage verdict much different than
that returned by the original jury.

In contrast to the original

jury which was ill equipped without any substantive and meaningful
formula for properly evaluating the amount of punitive damages to
be awarded, a new jury with the Crookston standards would be far
more likely to render a punitive damage award which bears a
reasonable and rational relationship to actual damages in this
case.

6

II.
REMANDING THIS CASE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION
ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES, WITHOUT AN
ACCOMPANYING RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY, WOULD
VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF DUE
PROCESS AND RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY*
This Court's opinion in Crookston vacates the trial court's
order denying the motion for new trial or remittitur on the issue
of punitive damages, and further remands the case to the trial
court "for further consideration in light of this opinion." Id. at
34. The Court's opinion, however, does not clearly state what type
of procedure the parties are entitled to in order to facilitate
such "further consideration." Fire Insurance Exchange respectfully
submits that constitutional notions of due process and right to
trial by jury would be violated, absent a directive to the trial
court to retry the issue of punitive damages to a jury utilizing
the Crookston standards.
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Utah
guarantees the right of jury trial in civil cases:
In capital cases the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general
jurisdiction, excepting capital cases, a jury
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of
four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict
shall be unanimous.
In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A
jury in civil cases shall be waived unless
demanded.
See also, International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor
and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1981). Likewise, both
the federal and state constitutions prohibit the deprivation of

property "without due process of law." United States Constitution,
Amendment 14, Section 1; Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7.
Absent a directive to the trial court requiring a trial by
jury to determine the amount of punitive damages to be assessed
against

Fire

individually

Insurance

Exchange,

the

trial

court

may

act

to apply the new Crookston standards in passing

judgment on the original jury's "standardless" based punitive
award.
used

Such a procedure would result in one trier of fact, having

one formula, albeit of dubious assistance and guidance,

rendering a $4.0 million punitive award, and then the initial
reviewer of the award, i.e., the trial judge, would be called upon
to use the new standard articulated in Crookston to review and pass
upon the appropriateness of the amount of the original award.

In

effect, such a procedure would deny Fire Insurance Exchange its
right to have a jury apply the Crookston standards to the facts of
this case.

Likewise, such a procedure would seemingly deny Fire

Insurance Exchange's right to procedural fairness and due process.
For instance, on remand, absent a trial by jury, the trial court
might sustain the $4.0 million punitive award, even though there is
no evidence what the original jury may have awarded had it been
given

the Crookston

standards.

Fundamental

fairness

should

preclude either the trial court or this Court from speculating as
to what the original jury, or any other jury for that matter, would
or would not do in awarding punitive damages consistent with the
opinion in Crookston under the facts of this case.
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The better procedure at this juncture is for this Court to
simply vacate the punitive damage award and order a new trial on
the issue of punitive damages.

See Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center,

Inc., 702 P. 2d 98 (Utah 1985) (Court ordered new trial on issue of
punitive damages on remand).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Fire Insurance Exchange respectfully
requests that this Court order a new trial by jury on the issue of
the

amount

of

punitive

Insurance Exchange.

damages

to

be

assessed

against

Fire

To simply allow the trial court to use the

Crookston standards to pass on a fatally flawed standardless jury
award

of punitive damages would

effectively

deny Fire

Insurance

Exchange's right to due^jkrocess and trial by jury.
DATED this

0*+»+<r

ay of v
day

, 1991.
Sc HANNI

'

Phillip
Steepen J. Trayner
Attorneys for Defendant
Fire Insurance Exchange
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Determinative Authorities

A-l

Crookston, et al. v. Fire Insurance Exchange, Docket
No. 880034

A-2

11

Constitution of the United States Amend. XIV £1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, £10
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, excepting capital
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths
of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
S. Larry Crookston, Randi L.
Crookston, and Anna W. Drake,
Trustee of the Estate of
Spencer Larry Crookston and
Randi Lynn Crookston,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,

No. 880034
FILED
June 28, 1991

v.
Fire Insurance Exchange, a
California corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:

L. Rich Humphreys, Francis M. Wikstrora, Salt Lake
City, for appellees
Philip R. Fishier, Stephen J. Trayner, Salt Lake
City, and Frank A, Roybal, Bountiful, for appellant

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Fire Insurance Exchange ("Fire Insurance") appeals a
jury verdict awarding Spencer Larry Crookston and Randi Lynn
Crookston (collectively referred to as "the Crookstons") and
Anna W. Drake, trustee of the Crookstons1 estate, compensatory damages of $815,826 and punitive damages of $4,000,000
on various theories arising out of Fire Insurances failure
to pay in full a claim for property damage caused by the
collapse of the Crookstons* home while under construction.
Fire Insurance also appeals the trial court's award of
$175,000 in attorney fees and $11,126 in costs to the
Crookstons.
The jury found that Fire Insurance breached its
contract of insurance, including the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing recognized in Beck v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); intentionally
inflicted emotional distress upon the Crookstons; committed
fraud and misrepresentation in its handling of the
Crookstons* claims; and was the proximate cause of the
damages suffered by the Crookstons. Fire Insurance argues

that myriad substantive and procedural errors were committed
which require reversal of the verdict and/or the damage
awards. We find no reason to reverse on the issue of Fire
Insurance's liability. We also uphold the trial court's
determination that the compensatory damages are supported by
the evidence and well within the discretion of the jury.
iHowever^ we vacate the trial court's denial of a motion for a
i new trial on grounds that the punitive damage award was
| excessive and remand for further consideration consistent
f with this opinion.
~=On appeal/ we recite the facts in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. E.g., State v. Verde, 770
P.2d 116/ 117 (Utah 1989); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766/
769 (Utah 1985). Larry and Randi Crookston owned a vacant
lot in Davis County/ Utah# on which they wanted to build an
"earth" home# i.e./ a house constructed partially underground to take advantage of the natural heating and cooling
effects of the earth. In December of 1980, they approached
Rocky Mountain State Bank for a construction loan in the
amount of $60,000. The bank approved the loan with the
stipulation that the Crookstons obtain insurance naming the
bank as the loss payee. The Crookstons obtained such a
policy from Fire Insurance with a maximum coverage of
$67/000. The policy named the Crookstons as the insureds and
the bank as the loss payee.
In December of 1981/ the home/ which was 90 percent
completed/ collapsed. The Crookstons filed a claim with Fire
Insurance that month/ and an adjustor was assigned the
claim. A few months passed during which no progress was made
on the claim. The Crookstons then hired an attorney, Ralph
Klemm, to represent them in the claim adjustment. Klemm
assisted Fire Insurance in obtaining bids to have the home
repaired. By the end of March of 1982/ Fire Insurance had
received bids from two contractors: one in the amount of
$50/951/ and another in the amount of $49,600. In April of
1982/ Fire Insurances regional office extended settlement
authority in, the amount of $49/443. In May of 1982/ the
adjustor obtained another bid from an architect in the amount
of $74/000.
Later in May, Fire Insurance replaced the original
adjustor with one more experienced. The new adjustor/ Alan
Clapperton/ commissioned an engineer to do an analysis
limited to structural damage. The engineer was not informed
by Clapperton that his report would be the basis for a bid to
reconstruct the house. Clapperton then requested a bid to
rebuild the home from an inexperienced contractor.
Clapperton provided this contractor with a copy of the
engineer's analysis, representing that the engineer's limited
analysis encompassed the entire damage to be repaired. On
June 14/ 1982/ the contractor bid $27/830.60 to repair the

Mn
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home. Clapperton immediately made an appointment to meet
with a bank officer on June 16th to discuss settlement. On
the morning of the 16th, Clapperton received a call from
Ralph Klemm, the Crookstons' attorney, asking about the
status of any settlement. Clapperton told Klemm that he
needed a little more time and would be getting back to him
soon with a settlement proposal. Clapperton said nothing
about the bid he had received two days earlier or of the
meeting he had scheduled with the bank for later_£Jfcy*t same
day.
At the meeting with the bank, Clapperton did not
disclose the fact that three other bids, all substantially
higher, had been obtained, nor did he reveal that the
$27,830.60 bid was based on an engineerfs appraisal limited
to structural damage only. The bank officer agreed to settle
for slightly more than $32,000, the amount of the low bid
plus an approximation of the interest that had accrued on the
Crookston loan since the collapse. Knowing full well that
the $27,830.60 bid was substantially lower than any other
bid, Clapperton insisted that the bank accept a settlement
check made out only to the bank, not jointly to the bank and
the Crookstons, and that the bank execute a proof of loss
form releasing Fire Insurance from any further liability on
the claim. The settlement was effected that same day, and
all necessary documents were signed and exchanged.
The Crookstonsf attorney called the bank later on
June 16th. At that time, Klemm was told that the bank had
just settled the claim with Fire Insurance. Klemm immediately called Clapperton, who affirmed that Fire Insurance had
settled all claims under the policy with the sole loss payee,
the bank. Clapperton also stated that the insureds, the
Crookstons, did not have to be included in the settlement,
that nothing more was owing, and that he was closing his file.
Klemm called the bank and discussed the Crookstons*
situation. He learned that the bank intended to pursue a
deficiency claim against the Crookstons for the balance due
on the $60,000 loan that was not paid by the insurance
settlement. Because the Crookstons lacked the means to pay
off the loan, the bank.threatened foreclosure. In order to
avoid additional interest, attorney fees, and costs, the
Crookstons deeded the property on which the earth home stood
to the bank in lieu of foreclosure and then declared
bankruptcy.
In February of 1983, the Crookstons filed a suit
against the bank and Fire Insurance. As the pleadings
ultimately stood, the Crookstons alleged causes of action
against Fire Insurance for breach of contract, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and misrepresentation and

fraud. Against the bank, the Crookstons asserted claims for
breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach
of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation and fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. They sought actual
and punitive damages against both Fire Insurance and the
bank. Fire Insurance and the bank cross-claimed against each
other, asserting rights of contribution.
In January of 1987, Fire Insurance moved for summary
judgment based on a clause in the insurance contract requiring
that any actions against the company be brought within one
year of the date of loss. Fire Insurance argued that because
the date of loss was December of 1981, when the house
collapsed, and the action was brought fourteen months later,
in February of 1983, the action should have been barred. The
trial court denied the motion. Fire Insurance also moved to
bifurcate the proceedings, requesting that the cause of
action for breach of contract be separated from the remaining
causes of action, which motion the trial court also denied.
Five days before trial, on a Thursday afternoon, the
Crookstons agreed to settle with the bank. The afternoon of
the next day, a stipulation regarding the settlement was
executed, and the bank served and filed a motion for summary
judgment, seeking its dismissal from the action. This motion
was granted.
The case then proceeded to trial against Fire
Insurance. After a six-day trial, the jury awarded $815,826
in compensatory damages" and $4,000,000 in punitive damages.
Although the jury's award of compensatory damages was not
broken down further, testimony at trial attributed $323,399
of the $815,826 to economic loss, making the remaining
$492,427 apparently attributable to emotional distress and
loss of financial reputation. Fire Insurance filed a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, or
remittitur, which the court denied on December 30, 1987. On
January 11, 1988, the court entered an additional judgment
against Fire Insurance awarding the Crookstons attorney fees
of $175,000 and expenses of $11,126. Fire Insurance then
filed this appeal.
Fire Insurance claims as follows: (i) the trial
court erred in granting the bank's summary judgment motion,
which was both procedurally and substantively flawed;
(ii) the trial court erred in refusing to hold the action
barred by the one-year limitation period in the policy;
(iii) the jury instructions regarding fraud were erroneous;
(iv) the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of
either intentional infliction of emotional distress or fraud;
(v) attorney fees should not have been awarded; and (vi) the
compensatory and punitive damages were excessive under Utah
law and also violated constitutional notions of due process
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and the prohibition of excessive fines. We will address only
the dispositive issues.
Initially, we consider the claim that the trial
court erred in granting the bank summary judgment on Fire
Insurance's cross-claim for contribution. As noted earlier,
after settling with the Crookstons, the bank filed a summary
judgment motion four days prior to trial. In support of the
motion, the bank made several arguments: (i) it should be
dismissed from the case because it had settled wicn the
Crookstons; (ii) it was abandoning any claim for contribution
against Fire Insurance; and (iii) there was no legal basis
upon which Fire Insurance could recover against the bank on
its cross-claim for contribution because contribution is not
available to one found to have committed an intentional tort
or a breach of contract, the only two theories under which
the Crookstons were then proceeding against Fire Insurance.
The court held a hearing on the summary judgment
motion on May 26, 1987, the Tuesday following the motionfs
filing and the morning of trial, which was four calendar days
but only one business
day after the motion was filed with the
court.1 At the time of the hearing, Fire Insurance had not
filed any opposition papers* Fire Insurance argues that the
court was incorrect on the law of contribution and that the
summary judgment motion was procedurally flawed because it
was filed late. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We first
consider the procedural challenge.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires at least
ten days' notice before a hearing on a motion for summary
judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this case, only three
days intervened between the filing of the motion and the
hearing, two of which were weekend days and the other, a
legal holiday. Obviously, a technical violation of rule
56(c) occurred. Because a rule 56(c) violation does not
divest the court of jurisdiction over the motion, see Walker
v. Rockv Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 279, 508
P.2d 538, 541 (1973); Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v.
Blomcruist. 29 Utah 2d 58, 61-62, 504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972),
it has the power to grant summary judgment despite a rule
56(c) violation. However, such a violation will void the
grant unless the violation amounts to harmless error.2 £££
1. The intervening weekend was the Memorial Day weekend.
2. Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals in Gillmoor v.
Cumminas, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), reversed
a grant of summary judgment holding that the trial court
committed error when it ruled on the motion six days before
the time to respond to the moving party's motion to strike
supporting affidavits had expired, Gillmoor, however, even if
accepted as an accurate statement of Utah law, is inapposite
(Continued on page 6.)

«;

Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Blomauist, 29 Utah 2d at 62, 504 P.2d at
1021 (summary judgment upheld where time violation did not
adversely affect defendant's rights).
The harmless error analysis proceeds under Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 613 and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116
(Utah 1989).4 -Harmless error- is defined in Verde as an
error that is -sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude
there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings.- Verde, 770 P.2d at~=£20; accord.
e.g.. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987)
(explaining meaning of -reasonable- probability or likelihood). Put in other words, an error is harmful only if the
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to
undermine our confidence in the verdict. Knight, 734 P.2d at
920. Our task, then, is to determine whether a different
outcome on the summary judgment motion would have had a
reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of the case.
For purposes of the decision before us# the law of
contribution is governed by section 78-27-39 of the Code.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1973) (repealed 1986). That
section provides that a right of contribution among
tort-feasors is recognized only after one tort-feasor has
paid to discharge a liability common to two or more
tort-feasors -or more than his prorata share thereof.(Footnote 2 continued.)
here because no harmful error analysis was applied in that
case. Instead, the court of appeals apparently assumed
prejudice consistent with rule 61. It then remanded to the
trial court because it was -unable to determine from the
record . . . what the court actually considered in granting
the summary judgment . . . .- Id. at 18 n.3.
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61 states:
[N]o error or defect in any ruling or
order or in anything done or omitted by
the court or by any of the parties, is
ground for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears
to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not
affect the substantial rights of the
parties.
Utah R. Civ. P. 61.
4. In Verde, we discussed harmless error in depth and
attempted to articulate one harmless error standard that
harmonizes the various rules which state the concept in
different terms. One of the rules we considered in Verde is
rule 61. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Utah 1989).
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Id.5 Fire Insurance contends that an adequate time to
respond would have permitted it to persuade the trial court
that Fire Insurance was entitled to contribution from the
bank for damages caused by a breach of contract or an
intentional tort they jointly committed.
Even if we assume without deciding that Fire
Insurance is correct/ the trial court's error would be harmful
only if Fire Insurance can show that the jury awau&ed damages
against it for which there is a reasonable probability that
Fire Insurance could have persuaded the jury that it was
entitled to contribution from the bank. Here/ the jury was
instructed that it could award plaintiffs only such damages
as Fire Insurance proximately caused.6 The jury was not
told that it could award plaintiffs any damages to be paid by
Fire Insurance for which the bank was responsible. And there
is nothing in the record to persuade us that the jury violated
its instruction and awarded any damages against Fire Insurance
that were caused by the bank. There is not a reasonable
likelihood that a jury would have found the bank to owe Fire
Insurance contribution. Therefore, whether a right of
contribution actually existed between the bank and Fire
Insurance is of no consequence, and any error committed by
the trial court in proceeding to consider the inadequately
noticed motion for summary judgment is harmless*
We next address Fire Insurances contention that the
Crookstons1 claim was barred by the clause in the insurance
contract stating, "No suit or action on this policy for the
recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of
law or equity . . . unless commenced within 12 months next
after inception of the loss." This lawsuit was filed in
February of 1983, fourteen months after the house collapsed
in December of 1981. We have previously said that
5.

Section 78-27-39 provides:
(1) The right of contribution shall exist
among joint tort-feasors, but a joint
tort-feasor shall not be entitled to a
money judgment for contribution until he
[or she] has, by payment, discharged the
common liability or more than his [or her]
prorata share thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1973) (repealed 1986).
6. Instruction No. 37 states in full:
You are not to award damages for any
injury or condition from which the
plaintiffs may have suffered, or may now be
suffering, unless it has been established
by a preponderance of the evidence in the
case that such injury or condition was
proximately caused by the conduct of
defendant FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

contractual limitations on the time in which to bring actions
on insurance contracts M,if reasonable, are valid, binding
and enforceable,•w although looked upon with some disfavor,
Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co,, 595 P.2d 863, 865
(Utah 1979) (quoting Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
£Q_*_, 583 P.2d 101, 103 (Utah 1978)); see also Hibdon v. Truck
Ins, Exch.. 657 P.2d 1358, 1359 (Utah 1983); Anderson v.
Beneficial Fire & Casualty Co,, 21 Utah 2d 173, 175, 442 P.2d
933, 934 (1968). However, we have not addressed the question
of whether such standard form clauses operate to IJUait the
time in which one may bring an action grounded in tort as
opposed to breach of contract.
There is a split of authority on the question of
whether a limitation provision such as that contained in the
contract of insurance at issue here applies to bar an insured
from suing for an insurer's tortious conduct. Those courts
holding the provision effective to bar such a suit reason
that the tortious conduct of the insurer arises out of its
obligations under the provisions of the policy and, therefore, it would be inequitable not to give effect to the
limitation clause. See, G,g<, Barrow Dev, Co. v, Fulton Ins.
CflU, 418 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1969); Zieba v. Middlesex
Mut. Assurance Co., 549 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (D. Conn. 1982);
Modern Carpet Indus., Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 125 Ga.
App. 150, 152, 186 S.E.2d 586, 587 (1971).
Those courts holding standard form limitations of
the kind found in the Fire Insurance policy not applicable to
tortious conduct reason that tort causes of action are not
actions on the insurance contract but separate actions
arising from the breach of a positive legal duty imposed by
law. £££, etgt, Davis Vt State Farm Fire ft Casualty Cow 545
F. Supp. 370, 372 (D. Nev. 1982); Asher v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
308 F. Supp. 847, 852-53 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Murohv v. Allstate
Ins, CPt, 147 Cal. Rptr. 565, 571 (1978); Wabash Vallev
Protective Union vt James, 35 N.E. 919, 920 (ind. 1893);
Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 279, 452
N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (1983); Plant Vt Illinois Employers Ins,,
20 Ohio App. 3d 236, 237-38, 485 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1984);
Lewis v. Farmers Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 67, 69 (Okla. 1983);
Warmka v. Hartland Cicero Mut. Ins. Co.. 136 Wis. 2d 31, 35,
400 N.W.2d 923, 925 (1987).
In the context of a contract of insurance, we prefer
this latter line of cases. By reading the "no suit or action
on this policy" language as not covering tort, we are simply
following the usual rule by which we narrowly construe a
standard form contractual limitation provision that is not
bargained for and is drafted by the insurance company for its
own benefit, especially where that provision takes from the
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other party rights conferred by existing statutes.7 See,
e.g., LPS HOSP. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859
(Utah 1988); Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 94
Utah 570, 575, 80 P.2d 348, 351 (1938); Vallev Bank & Trust
v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Drauohon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc, 771 P.2d 1105,
1108-09 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (limitation must use clear
language).
Because we conclude that the Crookstons1 tort causes
of action are not barred by the insurance contract's limitations provision, and because we have sustained the trial
courtfs decision to uphold the juryfs finding of the tort of
fraud and all damages awarded by the jury can be sustained
upon the finding of fraud, we need not address the question
of which of the other causes of action asserted by the
Crookstons may be barred by the contractual limitation.8
We next consider Fire Insurance's challenge to the
jury's finding that Fire Insurance committed fraud* Fire
Insurance contends that the jury instruction describing the
fraud cause of action was erroneous. It also argues that
even if the jury were properly instructed, there was
insufficient evidence to support the finding of fraud.
We first address Fire Insurance's claim that
instruction 28 omitted or misstated three of the nine
elements of fraud required in Utah. See generally Pace v.
Parrish, 122 Utah 141# 144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952).
Fire Insurance concedes that no objection was raised at trial
to instruction 28, as is required by Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 51. That rule states in pertinent part, "No party
may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he [or she] objects thereto." Utah R.
Civ. P. 51. Fire Insurance would have us consider the
propriety of the instruction anyway, relying on another part
of rule 51, which states that "notwithstanding the foregoing
7. See section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code, which confers a
six-year limitation on actions pertaining to written
instruments. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (1987).
8. We note that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is an implied contractual provision, and a cause of action for
its breach sounds in contract. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch..
701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985). However, we have never
addressed the question of whether the time for bringing an
action for such a breach runs from the date of the harm caused
by the breach of the covenant or from the date of the event
triggering the insured's alleged liability on the policy. If
it runs from the former date, then the contractual limitation
would not have barred the Crookstons' suit on that claim
because the suit was filed less than twelve months after the
challenged settlement with the bank.

q

requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in
the interests of justice, may review the giving of or failure
to give an instruction." Id.
We hold that discretionary review is not appropriate
in this case. The last clause of rule 51 does permit us to
review instructional errors in the interests of justice.
"However, 'it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to
present a persuasive reason' for exercising that discretion
. . . and this requires 'showing special circumstances
warranting such a review.'" Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14,
17 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). In State v. Eldredcre,
773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989), we described the content of
the analogous "manifest injustice" exception to Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 19(c)'s requirement that any instructional
errors raised on appeal be first called to the trial court's
attention by proper objection. We held that the term
"manifest injustice" embodied the concepts of "plain error."
See Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35-36. The last clause of rule 51
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure embodies the same
concept. See State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120-22 (Utah
1989). In the present case, Fire Insurance has not begun to
make the showing required by rule 51. Here, there was simple
failure of trial counsel to preserve a narrow technical
objection to an instruction. See Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d
at 17. Therefore/ we decline to consider its challenge to
the fraud instruction.
We next address Fire Insurance's contention that the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of fraud and
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("j.n.o.v."). Before
we consider this contention, we note the standard of review.
In deciding whether to grant a new trial, a trial court has
some discretion, and we reverse only for abuse of that
discretion. In passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v., however,
a trial court has no latitude and must be correct. X&. 9
Appellate review of a trial court's denial of either motion
9. In citing Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988), we
note one point in which the lead opinion may be misleading.
It states that "a new trial may be granted whenever there is
evidence that would have permitted entry of a judgment for the
losing party." Id. at 17. This statement is an accurate
statement of the standard to be applied by an appellate court
reviewing a trial court's grant of a new trial under rule
59(a)(6). Read as a statement of the standard to be applied
by a trial court addressing a new trial motion, it is
inaccurate. A trial court cannot grant a new trial if there
is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party
and the judge merely disagrees with the judgment of the jury.
Mere disagreement is not a sufficient basis on which to set
(Continued on page 11.)

No. 880034

10

based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, however,
is governed by one standard because of the differing degrees
of discretion we accord trial courts in ruling initially on
these motions. !&. Under that standard, we reverse only if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict. Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17; King v. Feredav, 739 P.2d
618, 620-21 (Utah 1987); Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins,
Brown, & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986).
To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to
support the jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in
the light most favorable to the findings. E.g., Morgan v.
Ouailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 577 n.3 (Utah
1985); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
Here, Fire Insurance has made no attempt to marshal the
evidence in support of the jury finding of fraud* In fact/
all Fire Insurance has done is argue selected evidence
favorable to its position. That does not begin to meet the
marshalling burden it must carry. We do not sit to retry the

facts.

£££ Cambelt inf 1 CoEPt vt Palton, 745 P.2d 1239,

1242 (Utah 1987); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769
(Utah 1985). This failure alone is grounds to reject Fire
Insurance^ attack on the fraud finding. E.g., Hansen, 761
P.2d at 17; Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987);
Hagan v. Hagan, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 66, 69 (Utah Ct* App.
1991).
Even if we were to review the record evidence for
support, we would reject Fire Insurance's attack. The
Crookstons alleged seven theories under which fraud could be
found, and a casual review of the record indicates that there
is ample evidence on at least one of the Crookstons' fraud
theories to sustain the verdict.
We have previously restated the elements of fraud as
follows:
(1) That a representation was made;
(Footnote 9 continued.)
aside a verdict and order a new trial. King v. Fereday, 739

p.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1987); Price-Qrem Invt Cot Yt Rollins,
Brown, & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986); £££.

9lso c. Wright & A . Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 2803 (1973). Rather, a trial judge may properly grant a
new trial under rule 59(a)(6) when he or she can reasonably
conclude that the verdict is clearly against the weight of the
evidence or that there is insufficient evidence to justify the
verdict as more fully explained in Goddard v. Hickman, 585
P.2d 530 (Utah 1984); see also Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d
350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961).

(2) concerning a presently existing
material fact;
(3) which was false;
(4) which the representor either (a) knew
to be false, or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that he [or she] had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such
representation;
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other
party to act upon it;
(6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity;
(7) did in fact rely upon it;
(8) and was thereby induced to act;
(9) to his [or her] injury and damage.
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75

(1952); see also Mikkelson Vt Quail valley Realty, 641 p.2d
124, 126 (Utah 1982); Kofrlec v, garden City, 639 P.2d 162,
166 (Utah 1981); wgjqht v, westside Nursery, 787 p.2d 508,
512 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). See generally 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud
and Deceit §§ 432-436 (1968). We also stated in Pace that
the elements of fraud must be proven by "clear and convincing
evidence." Pace, 122 Utah at 143, 247 P.2d at 274.
One of the seven theories upon which the Crookstons
relied was that on June 16, 1982, Clapperton misrepresented
to Klemm that Fire Insurance was not yet in a position to
settle the claims and that he would include the Crookstons in
any settlement negotiation. Clapperton made these representations knowing that he was prepared to settle with the bank
that very day. There is ample evidence to support these
factual claims.
As for Fire Insurance's challenge to the jury's
findings that reliance was reasonable and that the alleged
misrepresentation did not damage the Crookstons, the record
substantiates that the jury could have found by clear and
convincing evidence that the Crookstons relied on Clapperton's
representation that the company was not ready to settle and
were induced to inaction thereby, with the result that Fire
Insurance was able to settle the matter with the bank without
their participation for an unfairly low amount. The inadequacy of the amount paid the bank by Fire Insurance set in
motion the events that ultimately resulted in the Crookstons*
bankruptcy and the ensuing harm. Therefore, we find no error
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in the denial of both the j-n.o.v. and the new trial motion
on this ground.
Fire Insurance's next claim is that the award of
compensatory and punitive damages violates the ban on
excessive fines and the due process provision of the Utah
Constitution* See Utah Const, art. I, § 9; Utah Const,
art. I, § 7. 10 Fire Insurance did not, however, raise
these arguments before the trial court and has therefore
waived any right to present them on appeal.11 Seg=P e.g.,
Ream v. Fitzen, 581 P.2d 145, 148-49 (Utah 1978); Bullock v.
Joe Bailey Auction Co., 580 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah 1978); Edgar
v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405, 407 (Utah 1977); State Road Comm'n
v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 300, 495 P.2d 817, 821 (1972).
Fire Insurance also attacks the jury's verdict under
rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That
rule provides that a trial court can grant a new trial if the
damages awarded are "excessive [in amount] . . . appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice."
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5). Fire Insurance contends that both
the compensatory and the punitive damage awards meet this
10. Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall
not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be
treated with unnecessary rigor." Utah Const, art. I, § 9.
Article I, section 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
11. Regarding the claimed due process violations, we note
that the United States Supreme Court recently held that the
procedures followed under Alabama law in awarding and
reviewing punitive damage awards were adequate and did not
violate the federal due process provision. See Pacific Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Haslip. No. 89-1279,
U.S.
(1991); ss&

also Browning-Ferris Indust v» Kelco Disposal, Inc t , 106 L.
Ed. 2d 219, 242 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring); Bankers Life
& Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (OfConnor,
J., concurring). In Hammond v. Citv of Gadsden. 493 So. 2d
1374 (Ala. 1986), Alabama implemented a procedure requiring a
post-trial hearing in cases involving punitive damages wherein
the judge must state on the record the reasons for revising or
upholding the jury's award. See generally D. Blan & J. Hart,
The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, December 1990 For
the Defense 12, 20. The procedure has now largely been
enacted by statute- Sea Ala. Code § 6-11-23 (Supp. 1990).
The standards followed by courts of this state in the past for
awarding punitive damages, and certainly the standards we
today adopt for review of punitive damage awards, are at least
as stringent as, if not more stringent than, those followed in
Alabama.

l -*

test and that the trial court erred in denying its motion for
a new trial or a remittitur. In support of its contention,
Fire Insurance relies on a number of our prior decisions in
which we reduced or reversed awards of compensatory or
punitive damages on grounds they were "excessive." See,
eTq-/ First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc.,
653 P.2d 591, 598-99 (Utah 1982) (upholding total compensatory
damages of $36,000 but cutting punitives from $100,000 to
$50,000 and compensatories for emotional distress from
$25,000 to $12,500).12
—Fire Insurance correctly points out that in the
present case, the amount of both compensatory and punitive
damages awarded is far greater than the awards reduced in
many prior cases and that the ratio of punitives to compensatories is higher than has been sustained in any of our
prior cases where large dollar awards were made. Essentially,
Fire Insurance contends that the results in those cases, when
considered together, amount to a determination of what constitutes "excessive" damages as a matter of law, damages that we
have concluded must have been the result of passion or
prejudice. Fire Insurance asks that even if we sustain the
finding of liability for fraud, we make a reduction in the
amount of both compensatory and punitive damages. Alternatively, it asks that we remand for a new trial on the issue
of damages.
12. Other cases in which we have reduced or vacated and
remanded damage awards include Jensen v. Pioneer Dodae Center,
Inc.f 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 1985) (upholding compensatories of
$1,400 but remanding for reduction of punitives of $100,000 as
grossly disproportionate); Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692
P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) (remanding for reduction a $25,000
punitive award as grossly disproportionate to compensatory
damages of $2,133 where court found a low degree of malice and
there were no findings as to defendant's wealth); Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) (compensatory damages of
$59,600 upheld but punitive award of $25,000 reversed for
failure to establish defendant's net worth); Cruz v. Montoya,
660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) (reducing punitives from $12,000 to
$6,000 based on lack of findings as to defendant's wealth
where compensatories were $9,000, $7,500 of which were
"soft"); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975) (reducing

punitives from $10,000 to $5,000); Prince yf Peterson, 538
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975) (reducing punitives already below
compensatory damages with no explanation); Nance v. Sheet

Metal workers int'l Assoc, 364 p.2d 1027 (Utah 1961)
(reversing $40,000 punitives entered by trial court where jury
had awarded none and where there were only nominal compensatory damages); Wilson v. Oldrovd, 267 P.2d 759 (Utah 1954)
(punitives of $25,000 reduced to $5,000 where compensatories
were $50,000) .
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In deciding whether Fire Insurance's claim has any
merit, we have reviewed many of our prior decisions passing
on claims that damage awards were "excessive." We have also
reviewed many of our prior cases considering claims that a
trial court had abused its discretion in granting or denying
a. motion for a new trial. Collectively, this review has left
us dissatisfied with the state of the case law. There is
little consistency either in our statements of the appropriate standard of review to be applied or in the standard we
have actually applied. Sometimes, we have approacITed such
cases as though we were reviewing a trial court's review of
the verdict," while at other times, we appear to have
directly reviewed the verdict, ignoring any intermediate
actions by the trial court.14
Because the standard-of-review law is confused in
this area, we must attempt to clarify it before considering
the merits of Fire Insurance's claim. Today, we attempt to
bring some order to the processes used in determining and
reviewing damage awards* We will address the relative roles
of the jury, the trial court, and the appellate court. We
will also address the substantive standards for determining
the lawfulness of a particular award. Our discussion of the
subject will be divided into three parts. First, we will
address the standard of review to be applied by a trial court
considering a motion that attacks the amount of a jury's
damage award. Second, we will discuss the standard of review
to be followed by an appellate court reviewing a trial court's
decisions on a challenge to a jury's damage award. Third, we
will explain the substantive standards by which the damage
13. Cases in which we seem to defer to the trial court
include Elkinaton v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980) (deferring to trial court stating that its action on the award lends
solidarity); Holdawav v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 80, 505 P.2d
295, 296 (1973) (w[W]e cannot say that the trial judge abused
his discretion in not further reducing the amount of punitive
damages."); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 140, 369 P.2d 290,
295 (1962) (action of trial court lends verity to verdict,
although court speaks of reviewing jury directly); Wellman v.
-Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 353-54, 366 P.2d 701, 703-04 (1961)
(trial court upheld if reasonable); Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah
381, 386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (1941) (trial court accorded
great latitude).
14. £££, e.g., Terry v. Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314, 327-28 (Utah
1979) (reversing remittitur and reinstating original award),
rgv'fl on refr'q, 617 P.2d 700 (1980); Prince v. Petersen, 538
P.2d at 1329 (reducing trial court award without explanation);
Falkenbura v. Neff, 269 P. 1008, 1013 (1928) (reducing
punitives of $5,000 to $1,500 where compensatories were
$362.50 while stating that court defers to trial court in
assessing damages except where, as here, they are so
disproportionate as to be excessive as a matter of law).

award is to be judged. Finally, we will apply these
standards to the decision of the trial court here.
The first part of our clarification effort requires
an explanation of the standard of review to be applied by a
trial court in ruling on a motion for a new trial attacking
the amount of the jury's award. Initially, we note the
procedural posture in which claims that a particular damage
award is excessive generally come before the trial court
because it is critical to understanding the relaii^Le roles of
jury, trial court, and appellate court. After a jury returns
a damage award in a civil case, the most common way for the
losing party to challenge the amount of the award is to move
for a new trial or remittitur under rule 59(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 59(a) provides in part:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the
provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on
all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes . . . :
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of
the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion
by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury

. . . .

(3) Accident or surprise, which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence

. . . .

(5) Excessive or inadequate damages,
appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a). 1 5
15. It should be noted that although many of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure differ only slightly, if at all, from the
(Continued on page 17.)
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The general rule governing the grant of a new trial
is that the trial court must find at least one of the seven
(Footnote 15 continued,)
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 59 is different. The
Utah rule lists seven exclusive grounds on which a new trial
may be granted. In contrast, the federal rule simply states
that a new trial may be granted -for any of the reasons for
which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at
law in the courts of the United States.- Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(a)(1); cf^_ Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a).
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350
(4th Cir. 1941), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit provided an articulate history of rule 59,
tracing it back to the 17th century. Quoting from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it stated:
[Ability to grant new trials] is a power to
examine the whole case on the law and the
evidence, with a view to securing a result,
not merely legal, but also not manifestly
against justice/—a power exercised in
pursuance of sound judicial discretion,
without which the jury system would be a
capricious and intolerable tyranny. . . .
[I]t was a power the courts ought to
exercise unflinchingly.
IJL. at 353 (quoting Smith v. Times Publishing Co., 178 Pa.
481, 36 A. 296, 298 (1897)). The court continued:
[The jurors] are not, and have never been,
independent of the court of which they are
a part, but their verdicts must meet the
approval/ or at least they must not offend
the sense of justice, of the presiding
judge, who, as the late Justice Grier, of
the supreme court of the United States/ was
fond of saying, was by virtue of his [or
her] position "the thirteenth juror."
Id. (citations omitted). The court noted that Lord Mansfield
had also recognized the necessity of "a power, somewhere/ to
grant new trials.- Id. (quoting Bright v. Envon, 1 Burrows
390 (1757)).
Finally, the court went on to explain the uniqueness of
the standard of review for new trial motions due to the facts
that the trial court/ in reviewing the jury, must give them
some deference and that the appellate court must defer to the
trial judge in further reviewing the decision. Unlike
directing a verdict, which a trial judge may do "only where
there is no substantial evidence, [a v]erdict may be set aside
and new trial granted, when the verdict is contrary to the
clear weight of the evidence, or whenever in the exercise of a
sound discretion the trial judge thinks this action necessary
to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 354 (citations
omitted).
(Continued on page 18.)

grounds listed in rule 59 to be met, 16 See Hancock v.
Planned Dev. Corp,, 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990); Tanaaro v.
Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 292 n.2, 373 P.2d 390, 391 n.2
(1962); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 89-90 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) . In the context of a challenge to the amount of
an award, two of those grounds are pertinent, subparts
(5)—excessive damages—and (6)—insufficient evidence• If
the court finds that a new trial is warranted on one of these
grounds as to the amount of the award, it may encourage the
parties to come to some mutually agreeable solution-rather
than incur the time and expense of a new trial* The court
often does this, in the context of a damage award, by
proposing a remittitur or additur to the jury's award of
damages. See Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Johnson, 550 P.2d 216,
217 (Utah 1976); Ruf v. Association for World Travel Exch.,
10 Utah 2d 249, 249, 351 P.2d 623, 623 (1960); Bourne v.
Moore, 77 Utah 184, 186, 292 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1930); Gearv v.
Cain, 69 Utah 340, 347, 255 P. 416, 420 (1927);. Eleaanti v.
Standard Coal Co., 50 Utah 585, 592, 168 P. 266, 268 (1917).
The parties may then accept the alteration and avoid a new
trial or reject the proposal and begin anew. 17 If the
party against whom the motion is brought rejects the
proposal, the court may then grant a new trial on the issue
of damages.
(Footnote 15 continued.)
Although the Fourth Circuitfs review was related to the
development of the federal rule, Utah's rule is based on the
same rationale. Utah has simply chosen to delineate specific
exclusive grounds, which the federal courts have not done. We
accept the Fourth Circuit's summary in Aetna Casualty as
largely accurate.
16. Those portions of Utah's rule 59 with which we are
concerned date back at least to 1888, when rule 59's predecessor was part of Utah's Code of Civil Procedure. See 1888
Utah Laws ch. 8, § 3400. These provisions have remained
largely unchanged since that time. The statute was apparently
modeled after a similar California provision enacted in 1851.
See 1851 Cal. Stat. ch. 5, § 193, at 81 (current version
enacted in 1872). Utah's original version of the law, adopted
in 1870, was modeled after this California provision. See
1870 Utah Laws ch. 7, art. 2, § 193. Although the Utah
provision changed repeatedly until 1888, the 1888 version is
substantially similar to that now found in rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. For that reason, our review of
relevant case law includes reference to many Utah decisions
that antedate the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1951.
17. Federal courts also allow for such a procedure. "A
remittitur gives the plaintiff a choice. He [or she] can
refuse to accept the reduced amount of damages and instead
proceed to a new trial." 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2815 (1973).
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Under our rule 59, it is well settled that, as a
general matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant
or deny a motion for a new trial, Hancock, 791 P.2d at
184-85; Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah
1988); Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 186, 389 P.2d 736,
736 (1964); Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins, Co,, 5 Utah 2d 257,
261, 391 P.2d 290, 292-93 (1964); Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394,
407, 98 P. 300, 305 (1908). The precise nature of that
discretion and what constitutes an abuse, however, are not
clearly stated in many of our individual cases, though
perhaps it may be gleaned from a collective reading of them.
In the context of a new trial motion attacking the amount of
a jury verdict under subparts (5) and (6) of rule 59(a), it
is the responsibility of the trial court to review the amount
of the award to ensure that the jury has acted within its
proper bounds. If the verdict does not satisfy the
requirements of 59(a)(5) or (6), the judge must uphold the
award.
The reason that any determination as to whether the
jury exceeded its proper bounds is best made in the first
instance by the trial court is that the trial judge is
present during all aspects of the trial and listens to and
views all witnesses. Therefore, he or she can best determine
if the jury has acted with "passion or prejudice" and whether
the award was too small or too large in light of the evidence.
The trial judge is free to grant or deny a motion for a new
trial if it is reasonable to conclude that the jury erred.
Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961). On
the other hand, the trial court cannot grant a new trial
merely because it disagrees with the jury's judgment. King
v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1987); Price-Orem Inv.
Co. v, Rollins, Brown, & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58
(Utah 1986); S3SL Saltgs v, Affleck/ 99 Utah 381, 386-87, 105
P.2d 176, 178 (1940).18
If the trial court determines that a new trial is
warranted and grants the motion, it should describe the basis
for its decision in the record such that an appellate court
can have the benefit of those reasons. In Saltas v. Affleck,
Justice Moffat, speaking for this court, described why such a
statement of reasons is necessary:
In order to eliminate speculation as to the
basis of the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting new trials, the
record should show the reasons and make it
clear the court is not invading the
18. But cf. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1989)
(stating that trial judge may grant new trial whenever there
is evidence to support different verdict). This statement in
Hansen is clarified in footnote 9 of this opinion.
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province of the jury. The trial court
should indicate wherein there was a plain
disregard by the jury of the instructions
of the court or the evidence or what
constituted bias p_r prejudice on the part
of the jury. If no reasons need be given
the province of the jury may be invaded at
will. With no indication as to the basis
for exercise of the power vested in the
court to grant new trials the appeal
tribunal would be left to analyze the
matter from the evidence, the record, and
the instructions. It would be required to
search out possible reasons for agreeing or
disagreeing with the trial court in the
exercise of a discretion. The exercise of
judicial discretion must be based upon some
facts notwithstanding great latitude is
accorded the trial court in such matter.
Saltas, 99 Utah at 386-87, 105 P.2d at 178 (citation omitted)*
Thus, in passing on a motion for a new trial, if the
trial court cannot reasonably find that the jury erred, it
should deny the motion. On the other hand, if the trial
court can reasonably conclude that there was insufficient
evidence to justify the verdict or it is manifestly against
the weight of the evidence in violation of rule 59(a)(6) or
that the jury acted with passion or prejudice contrary to
rule 59(a)(5), it may grant the motion and order a new trial*
We next address the standard of review by which an
appellate court reviews a trial court decision to grant or
deny a new trial motion challenging a verdict as excessive
under rule 59. In reviewing the judge's ultimate decision to
grant or deny a new trial, we will reverse only if there is
no reasonable basis for the decision.19 See Wellman v.
Noble, 12 Utah 2d at 353, 366 P.2d at 703; see also State v.
Petersen, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20-21 (Utah 1991). For
example, even if the jury's award appears supported by
substantial evidence on appeal, if the trial judge could
reasonably conclude that the jury had acted in a manner
covered by the grounds stated in rule 59(a)(5) or (6), an
order granting a new trial will be upheld on appeal.
Wellman, 12 Utah 2d at 354, 366 P.2d at 704. Similarly, a
19. We note that if, as a preliminary matter prior to the
ultimate determination of the motion, the judge relies on
legal principles which are erroneous or facts which are wholly
without record support, this may also constitute grounds for
reversal. See State v. Petersen, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20
(Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 n.3 (Utah
1991).
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trial court's decision to deny a new trial will be upheld if
there is a reasonable basis to support that decision.20
In light of the foregoing, some statements about
standards of review in prior cases can be read as misleading,
though not actually incorrect. For example, in Bennion v.
LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985),
we stated that a "reviewing court will defer to a jury's
damage award unless the award indicates that the jury
disregarded competent evidence.- Id. at 1084 (citations
omitted); see also Battv v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043
(Utah 1978). See generally Bundv v. Century Equip. Co., 692
P.2d 754 (Utah 1984); First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J.
Feedvards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). This statement of
the standard, though perhaps not an inaccurate characterization of the test to be applied by a trial court faced with a
new trial motion under rule 59, is inaccurate if it purports
to state the standard of review by which an appellate court
determines the propriety of a trial courtfs decision to grant
or deny a new trial* The statement can be read to mean that
this court reviews the juryfs action directly, when in
reality we review the trial court's action for an abuse of
discretion.21 It is this type of loosely worded standard
which has, over time, effectively confused the appellate
court's proper role in assessing the merits of a rule 59
motion attacking a jury verdict with that of the trial
judge. E.g., Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1083-84; Bundy, 692 P.2d
at 758-59; First Security/ 653 P.2d at 599; Patty, 575 P.2d
at 1043.
Having, we hope, clarified the respective roles of
the trial and appellate courts as they pertain to rule 59
attacks on jury verdicts, we now move on to consider the
merits of Fire Insurance's challenge to the amount of
compensatory and punitive damages awarded by the jury. Fire
Insurance contends that both compensatory and punitive
damages are excessive. Because issues of law and policy
differ as to each type of damages, we consider these claims
separately.
We first address the compensatory damage award.
Fire Insurance relies on First Security Bank of Utah v.
20. We note that the trial court's discretion with regard to
denying a motion for a new trial or a remittitur on the issue
of punitive damages is further limited by other conditions as
explained later in this opinion. See infra notes 24-31 and
accompanying text.
21. We note that in Bennion, no new trial motion was
presented to the trial court and, thus, this court was
considering the issue de novo. See Bennion v. LeGrand Constr.
Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083-84 (Utah 1985). We use this
statement of the standard in Bennion as an example simply
because of the possibility that it may be misread.

J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc., as support for its claim that the
compensatory damages are excessive. The Crookstons' economic
loss amounted to approximately $323,399. Fire Insurance
argues that the remaining $492,427 awarded to the two
Crookstons, who are no longer married, for emotional and
mental distress and loss of financial reputation is
excessive. Fire Insurance argues that the soft compensatory
damages in this case are analogous to the damages for
emotional distress in First Security, which were cut from
$25,000 to $12,500 on appeal. In First Securitvrr!this court
stated that damages for emotional distress should be awarded
with caution. Id. at 598; see also Gumbs v. Pueblo Infl.
Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 1987).
In the present case, Judge Frederick considered the
excessiveness of the compensatory damages when Fire Insurance
moved for a new trial or a remittitur. He concluded not only
that the amount awarded was justified by both the law and the
evidence, but that even a higher amount would have been
appropriate. He made the following observations:
During the course of the ten or so days
that we tried the case/ it was my
observation that indeed we were dealing
here with conduct which was pernicious,
pernicious not merely in the sense of the
defendant[fs] having taken und[ue]
advantage of the insureds, the Crookstons,
in treating their claim in a high-handed
fashion, but pernicious further in the
sense that clear, unequivocal
misrepresentations were made by agents of
the defendant to the plaintiffs and to
their counsel, and as if that were not
sufficient, pernicious in the form of
conduct, which, while it may not have been
geared to create emotional harm and
suffering to the plaintiffs, was, at the
very least, in reckless disregard of their
rights by dealing sub rosa with the bank
and thereafter closing the file and
advising the plaintiffs to file, the claim
file would be closed.
In making an ultimate determination of the propriety
of the award, Judge Frederick stated:
I have reviewed my notes and I recall the
evidence in the regard that I am referring
to and I am not in the least persuaded that
the jury in this case overstepped their
bounds in awarding excessive general
damages and punitive damages. On the
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contrary, this case, in my judgment, could
well have resulted in greater damages than
were awarded by the jury.
While it is true, as we stated in First Security,
that soft compensatory damages, i-e., for pain and suffering,
must be awarded with caution, °[w]hen the determination of
the jury has been submitted to the scrutiny and judgment of
the trial judge, his [or her] action thereon should be
regarded as giving further solidarity to the judtjffifertt • *
Elkinaton v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980)- Or, as we
said in Gearv v. Cain, 69 Utah at 358, 255 P. at 423, M[I]n
case of doubt, the deliberate action of the trial court
should prevail- Otherwise this court will sooner or later
find itself usurping the functions of both the jury and the
trial court." JiU These statements in Elkinaton and Geary
are consistent with our statement of the appropriate
appellate standard of review todayThe judge's determination to deny a new trial on
this issue was reasonable in light of the law and the facts.
See Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989); In
re Estate Of Bgrtell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)- In
addition, Judge Frederick articulated support for the award
in the record- Although his statements could have been more
specific, they were sufficient to justify his upholding the
compensatory damage award- See Saltas, 99 Utah at 386-87,
105 P-2d at 178. We therefore uphold the trial court's
decision to deny a new trial on the question of compensatory
damages-22
22. Although Fire Insurance also contends on appeal that the
court failed to allocate attorney fees between the bank and
Fire Insurance, that argument was not raised below and is
therefore waived- See State v. Anderson, 789 P-2d 27, 29
(Utah 1990).
Fire Insurance also argues that the award here so shocks
"one's conscience [as] to clearly indicate passion, prejudice,
or corruption on the part of the jury." Duffy v. Union
Pacific R.R., 118 Utah 82, 89, 218 P.2d 1080, 1083 (1950)
(citations omitted). Therefore, Fire Insurance contends that
regardless of the trial court*s action, this court can and
should reverse or reduce the award as we did in First
Security, 653 P.2d at 598-99; see also Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1
Utah 2d at 372, 267 P.2d at 764; Duffy, 118 Utah at 91-92, 218
P.2d at 1085- We stated in Bundv v. Century Equipment Co.,
692 P.2d at 760, "It is well settled that when an award of
punitive damages is determined to be excessive or otherwise
inappropriate, this court may order a new trial on the issue
of damages or, in the alternative, remission of a portion of
the punitive damages by the plaintiff. •• ££. While it is true
that this court has the power to grant a new trial in an
(Continued on page 24,)
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We next consider the claim that the punitive damage
award was excessive, warranting a new trial. The jury
awarded $4,000,000 in punitive damages, which Fire Insurance
claims is excessive under rule 59(a)(5) for the same reasons
it argued that the compensatory damage award is excessive.
Any motion for a new trial on the question of punitive
damages requires that the trial court engage in a two-part
inquiry:23 (i) whether punitives are appropriate at all,
i.e., whether the evidence is sufficient to support a lawful
jury finding of defendant's requisite mental state—see Utah
R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6); Elkinaton v. Foust, 618 P.2d at 41;
(Footnote 22 continued.)
appropriate case, we will do so only according to the standard
we adopt today, i.e., we will not substitute our judgment for
that of the trial judge in making a decision on a motion for a
new trial. Such a decision will be upheld if there is a
reasonable basis for it based on the law and the facts. This
court's statement in Duffy applies equally here:
The verdict here was admittedly liberal.
But the mere fact that it was more than
another jury, or more than this court,
might have given, or even more than the
evidence justified, does not conclusively
show that it was the result of passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the
jury.
Duffy, 118 Utah at 89, 218 P.2d at 1083 (citations omitted).
23* The legal elements that must be met to sustain an award
of punitive damages are now largely controlled by statute,
although the statute does not apply to this case because it is
made applicable only to claims for punitive damages arising on
or after May 1, 1989. 1989 Utah Laws ch. 237, § 4. Section
78-18-1 provides that before any punitive damages can be
awarded, the finder of fact must be shown "by clear and
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the
tortfeasor are the result of wilful and malicious or
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of,
the rights of others." Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1)(a) (Supp.
1990). Therefore, a judge faced with a new trial motion must
ensure that the evidence is sufficient on this point before
upholding any award. These standards do not apply to
punitives arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle
while voluntarily intoxicated. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-18-1(1)(b).
Under the statute, evidence of a defendant's wealth would
be admissible only after the jury had properly determined that
an award of punitive damages was proper. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-18-1(2). Additionally, 50 percent of any punitives
awarded in excess of $20,000 is remitted to the state
treasurer after payment of attorney fees and costs. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-18-1(3).
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Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359-60 (Utah 1975); Prince v.
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975), and (ii) whether
the amount of punitives is excessive or inadequate, appearing
to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5).
With regard to the first inquiry required of the
trial judge, under our case law, punitives are allowed only
where there is w'wilful and maliciousf conduct, . . . or
. . . conduct which manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of
others." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d
1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted); see also Rugg v.
Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 304, 117 P. 54, 57 (1911). Here,
although Fire Insurance's motion for a new trial on damages
did not expressly raise 59(a)(6) grounds, the trial court, in
passing on the new trial motion, did conclude that there was
substantial record evidence to support the juryfs determination that Fire Insurance acted with reckless disregard of
Crookston's rights. We also note that the jury properly
found intentional fraud. Therefore, we hold that the trial
court correctly concluded that Fire Insurance had acted with
the mental state required for punitives.
As to the second inquiry required—whether the
amount of the award was appropriate—Judge Frederick
articulated the same basis for denying a new trial on the
amount of punitives as he did for denying the motion on the
amount of compensatories. However, punitives are, by nature,
not to compensate but to punish and deter future egregious
conduct and are grounded on wholly different policies.
Moreover, the amount of punitives awarded here exceeds the
bounds of the general pattern set by our prior decisions.
Therefore, we vacate the trial court's ruling on the new
trial motion and remand for reconsideration.
We will now give a detailed explanation for this
portion of our holding.
As we noted earlier in this opinion, a review of our
case law on punitive damages has left us dissatisfied with
articulated standards for determining the amount of such
awards. These standards provide little guidance for either a
jury fixing the punitive damages, a trial court reviewing a
challenge to the amount of such an award, or an appellate
court reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of a new
trial on grounds of an inadequate or excessive award. We
have, however, found that the results of our prior cases
dealing with challenges to damages, taken as a whole, provide
patterns that furnish useful guidance as to what constitutes
an excessive award. Based on these patterns, we now craft a
set of guidelines that retain the advantages of flexibility
but clearly set parameters beyond which awards may not go

without some expressed justification. This framework should
bring some predictability to this area of the law and should
permit courts to more explicitly address the considerations
that come into play in fixing the amount of punitive damage
awards.
The stated list of factors we have said must be
considered in assessing the amount of punitives to be awarded
include the following seven: (i) the relative wealth of the
defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged miscoir*ret;
(iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct;
(iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and
others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the
misconduct; (vi) the relationship of the parties; and
(vii) the amount of actual damages awarded. See Bundv v.
Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984); Von Hake
v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 771 (Utah 1985). Our cases have
done little more than list these factors. No relative
weights have been assigned them, and no standards or formulas
have been established for properly evaluating them when
making an award or when reviewing the propensity of a jury
award. This makes such an enterprise highly problematic for
judge and jury. The finder of fact has no guidance on how
much weight to give each factor or even how the factors
should be assessed. And nothing suggests to the jury or the
trial court that there is any sort of limit or ceiling on an
award.
There is nothing uniquely vague about the punitive
damage standards set out in our cases. Many other
jurisdictions have quite similar lists of factors that are
supposed to guide the award of punitives. See American
College of Trial Lawyers, Report on Punitive Damages of the
Committee on Special Problems in the Administration of
Justice 3-7 (Mar. 3, 1989) [hereinafter "Report on Punitive
Damages"! (such vague standards are problematic nationwide).
And, quite predictably, the bases for awards made in those
jurisdictions are no more fathomable than ours. The problem
that results from this lack of guidance to juries and trial
courts is exemplified by disparate ratios of punitive to
actual damages that appear in separate cases involving
similar conduct.
It might be argued that widely disparate punitive
damage awards by separate juries for the same conduct
reflects only the weakness of the jury system, not the
weakness of the list-of-factors standard for measuring
punitives. But that explanation fails where it is confronted
with the fact that appellate courts in different jurisdictions
applying essentially the same standard have reached wildly
different conclusions as to what ratio of actuals to
punitives is legitimate under the pure list-of-factors
approach. Compare Employers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Tompkins,
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490 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1986) (upholding punitives of $400,000
and actuals of $500, a ratio of 800 to 1) with Prince v.
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975) (reducing punitives from
$3,000 to $1,000 where actuals were $5,537, with no
explanation). The Alabama Supreme Court has noted the
weakness in the list of factors used in Alabama, which is
quite similar to Utah's list:
[F]or the same conduct, one insurance
company and its special agent were punished
by a punitive damages award of $21,130.86
. . . and another insurance company and its
special agent were punished by a punitive
damages award of $2,490,000 . . . . The
instruction given to the juries in those
two cases were substantially the same.
. . . [T]he standard by which the jury is
to gauge.the amount of punitive damages, if
any, that it is to award is incomprehensibly
vague and unintelligible • • • • Under
such a "standard," one jury can award
$21,130.86 and another $2,490,000 for the
same "wrong."
Charter H O S P . of Mobile, Inc. v. Weinberg, 558 So- 2d 909,
916-17 (Ala. 1990).
Many states have recognized the problems created by
giving finders of fact essentially standardless discretion to
award punitive damages and have legislatively determined that
trial courts may not sanction punitive damage awards that
exceed actual damages by a certain ratio. See, e.g.f Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102 (1987) (punitives cannot exceed
actual damages); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.73(1)(a) (1989)
(punitives cannot exceed three times actual damages); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (punitives can only
exceed actual damages if clear and convincing evidence of
fraud, malice, oppression, or wanton or reckless disregard
for other's rights); see also Report on Punitive Damages 5
n.21.
At least one court has fixed a rough ratio ceiling
by judicial decision. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, in considering an award of punitive
damages in an intentional business tort case under Texas law,
stated, "A formula of punitive damages equal to three times
compensatory damages is a fairly good standard against which
to assess whether a jury abused its discretion.* Miley v.
Qppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 331 (5th Cir. 1981).
Other states have imposed strict dollar ceilings
on punitive damage awards. See, e,gf. Ga. Code Ann.
§ 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1990) ($250,000 ceiling except in cases

of product liability or intentional tort); Va. Code Ann,
§ 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1990) ($350,000 ceiling).
The courts of both Connecticut and Michigan have
judicially imposed bright-line limits on punitive damage
awards. See, e.g., Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v.
Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 127, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (1966)
(limiting punitives to compensate for expenses of litigation); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich.
401, 419-21, 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (1980) (only allowing-what it
termed "punitives" to compensate for "soft" or intangible
harm).
The advantages of imposing bright-line ceilings on
punitive awards are obvious. A ceiling provides unmistakable
guidance to juries, trial courts, and appellate courts.
However, the absolute ceiling approach is too mechanical and
could potentially defeat the very purpose of punitive damages.
See generally Phillips, A Comment on Proposals for
Determining Amounts of Punitive Awards, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1117
(1989); Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a
Principled Approach, 31 Hastings L.J. 639 (1980) [hereinafter
Mallor & Roberts]. For example, strict dollar amount,
percentage of the defendant's wealth, and ratio ceilings all
would allow potential defendants to calculate their exposure
to liability in advance, thus diminishing the deterrent
effect of punitive damages. In addition, such absolute
ceilings do not provide the flexibility needed to deal
adequately with the type of case that involves only minimal
actual damages, but where the conduct of the defendant is so
flagrant as to justify a large punitive award. See generally
Mallor & Roberts at 666-67.
Bearing in mind the weaknesses of reliance on a
list-of-factors standard alone and the weaknesses created by
absolute ceilings, whether legislatively or judicially
created, we conclude that when considered together, the
language and pattern of results from our prior cases provide
a basis for finding a middle ground.24
24. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Jensen
v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 1985);
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah
1985); Bundv v. Century Eouip. Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984);
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1984); Cruz v.
Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983); Branch v. Western
Petroleum, IttCt, 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Leigh Furniture &
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982); First Security
Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah
1982); Clavton v. Crossroads Eouip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah
1982); Elkinoton v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Terrv v.
Z.C.M.I.. 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other
(Continued on page 29.)
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Among the seven factors we have repeatedly listed
that should be considered in determining the amount of a
punitive damage award is the "amount of actual damages."
E.g., Bundy, 692 P.2d at 759- Although we have not
articulated any standard for determining the importance to be
assigned this factor, we have said that the amount of a
punitive damage award generally must bear a "reasonable and
rational" relationship to the actual damages. 25 I£. The
punitive damage awards we have characterized as violating
this "reasonable and rational- relationship rule have been
labeled "grossly disproportionate" to the actual damages
awarded and have been said to be the result of passion or
prejudice. These awards have been either reduced by this
court directly or remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. See, e.g., Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center,
Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 101 (Utah 1985).
Although vague in its articulation, an examination
of the results of our cases shows that in its operation, this
-reasonable and rational- relationship principle has produced
some fairly predictable results. Generally, we have found
punitive damage awards below $100,000 not to be excessive
only when the punitives do not exceed actual damages by more
than a ratio of approximately 3 to l. 2 6 See, e.g., Von
(Footnote 24 continued.)
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Co., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984);
Kesler v. Rogers, 542~P.2d 354 (Utah 1975); Prince v.
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975); Holdawav v. Hall, 29 Utah
2d 77, 505 P.2d 295 (1973); Powers v. Tavlor, 14 Utah 2d 152,
379 P.2d 380 (1963); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d
290 (1962); Nance v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l A s s o c , 12 Utah
2d 233, 364 P.2d 1027 (1961); Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d
390, 353 P.2d 989 (1960); Ostertao v. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130,
339 P.2d 1022 (1959); Sadleir v. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296
P.2d 278 (1956); Wilson v. Oldrovd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d
759 (1954); Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431
(1952).
25. Although this is only one of the factors identified by
this court to date to be considered in determining an
appropriate amount of damages, it is one which is more
concretely definable and which we today further refine to give
better guidance. We leave for another day the possibility of
further refining other factors we have previously identified,
as well as the possibility that additional factors may be
developed as we consider particular situations presented to us
in the course of reviewing trial court rulings.
26. A few cases have upheld punitives above a 3 to 1 ratio.
S££ Ostertao v. LaMont, 339 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1959) (upholding
punitives of $860 to actual damages of $140); see also
Falkenburo v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 270, 269 P.2d 1008, 1013
(1928) (reducing punitives to $1,500 where actuals were
$362.50) .
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Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Branch v. Western
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Elkincrton v.
Foust. 618 P-2d 37 (Utah 1980); Powers v. Tavlor, 14 Utah 2d
152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369
P.2d 290 (1962); Evans v. Gaisford. 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d
431 (1952).
Because of the limited number of cases considering
large awards, it is more difficult to note a particular
pattern once the award exceeds approximately $10-§=F§00.
However, it is safe to say that these large awards appear to
receive more scrutiny than the smaller awards and that the
acceptable ratio appears lower* See, e.g., Von Hake, 705
P.2d at 772 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting)
(majority opinion upholding $500,000 punitives—1 to 1
ratio); gynerqetics vt Mgygthon Rflnqhjng QQf, 701 P.2d 1106,
1113 (Utah 1985) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting)
(majority upholding $200,000 punitives—1/2 to 1 ratio). In
one such case, when the ratio exceeded 2 to 1, we reduced the
award on grounds of excessiveness. See First Security Bank,
653 P.2d at 598-99 (reducing $100,000 punitives—3 to 1
ratio—to $50,000—2 to 1 ratio).
The general rule to be drawn from our past cases
appears to be that where the punitives are well below
$100,000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to
actual damages have seldom been upheld and that where the
award is in excess of $100,000, we have indicated some
inclination to overturn awards having ratios of less than
3 to 1.
In these patterns, we find that guidelines emerge
for trial courts faced with challenges to punitive damage
awards on the grounds of excessiveness under rule 59(a)(5).
If the ratio of punitive to actual damages falls within the
range that this court has consistently upheld, then the trial
court may assume that the award is not excessive. In denying
a rule 59(a)(5) motion for a new trial, the trial court need
not give any detailed explanation for its decision if the
punitive damage award falls within this ratio range. If the
award exceeds the ratios set by our past pattern of decision,
the trial court is not bound to reduce it. However, if such
an award is upheld, the trial judge must make a detailed and
reasoned articulation of the grounds for concluding that the
award is not excessive in light of the law and the facts.
The judge's articulation should generally be couched in terms
of one or more of the seven factors we earlier listed as
proper considerations in determining the amount of punitive
damages, unless some other factor seems compelling to the
trial court. For example, a trial court might conclude that
an award should stand, despite a ratio that is higher than we
have generally approved, because the defendant displayed an
extremely high degree of malice, e.g., actual intent to
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harm 27 or a high degree of likelihood of great harm based
on the reprehensible nature of the act. 28
In addition to articulating support for the amount
of the award in terras of the relevant factors, the judge may
also want to explain why the large ratio of punitives to
actuals is necessary in the context of the particular case in
order to further the purposes of punitive damages "by
punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious_£iinduct [or
conduct which manifests a knowing or reckless indifference
toward, and disregard of, the rights of others] which is not
likely to be deterred by other means." Synergetics, 701 P.2d
at 1112; see also Behrens v. Raleigh Hills H O S P , , 675 P.2d at
1186. In sum, the trial judge's articulation should explain
why the award is not excessive despite the fact that it
exceeds the general pattern of awards upheld in our prior
cases. The purpose of this requirement for an articulation
of reasons warranting the denial of the rule 59(a)(5)
excessiveness motion is to permit more effective and reasoned
appellate review of the decision to uphold the award and to
enable the appellate court to more carefully consider the
various factors that may warrant punitives and the weight to
be accorded them, while giving adequate deference to the
advantaged position of the trial judge to appraise the
witnesses and the evidence. Such appellate review will
presumably lead to more substantive analysis of the punitive
damage standards than has been heretofore possible•
Should the trial court decide to either reduce or
enlarge an award of punitive damages by way of remittitur or
additur, it should also explain its action. See Saltas v.
Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (Utah 1940)
(requiring such an explanation when the trial court grants a
new trial motion). Factors that may justify a remittitur
could include the fact that the award exceeded the proper
ratio, lack of intent or a low degree of malice, the benign
nature of the act, the fact that a substantial portion of the
actual damages is "soft," thus making the ratio analysis
suspect, 29 or a substantial risk of bankrupting the
27. Sfifi, e,qt, Cox v. Stolworthv, 496 P.2d 682, 690 (Idaho
1972) (exemplary damages in deceptive for-profit business
scheme should make the cost of such repetitive antisocial
conduct uneconomical), overruled in part, Cheney v. Palos
Verdees Inv. Corp., 665 P.2d 661, 667 (Idaho 1983).
28. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding punitive award of
$3.5 million for "conscious and callous disregard of public
safety in order to maximize corporate profits"); Ford Motor
Co. v. Havlick, 351 So. 2d 1050, 1050 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977)
(upholding award of $1,740,000 against Ford).
29. Our past cases, taken together, also establish a
distinction between "hard" and "soft" actual damages when used
(Continued on page 32.)

defendant. The articulation of grounds for a remittitur or
an additur should serve the same purpose on appeal or where a
motion for a new trial is denied.
Returning to the present case, and applying the
standards we articulate today, we conclude that we must
vacate the denial of the motion for a new trial and remand
the matter for reconsideration by the trial court in light of
the foregoing discussion. At this time, we express no
opinion as to whether a remittitur should be grarrfeed on
remand. However, if one is again denied, the trial judge
must explain the reasons for denial under the standards set
forth above, given the large proportion of the compensatory
damages arguably attributable to emotional distress or loss
of financial reputation and the fact that the ratio of
punitives to compensatories here appears to be much higher
than in any case where we have upheld a punitive damage award.
Finally, a review of our cases leads us to observe
that a motion for a new trial challenging the amount of a
punitive damage award is most appropriately brought under
rule 59(a)(5), while a motion challenging an award of hard
actual damages is more appropriately brought under rule
59(a)(6). We note this because in reviewing damage awards in
the past, this court has at times seemed to merge a rule
59(a)(5) and (6) analysis. See generally Bennion v. LeGrand
Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985); Wellman v.
Noble. 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); Weber Basin Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958).
A challenge to the amount of an award of hard
compensatory damages, which by definition are to compensate
the plaintiff for some concrete loss, is most appropriately
scrutinized within a 59(a)(6) framework because subsection
(6) claims "[insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
(Footnote 29 continued.)
as a basis in determining the appropriate amount of punitive
damages. Where actual damages are largely "soft," this court
has been reluctant to uphold punitive damage awards of a ratio
that might survive scrutiny if the actual damages involved
were "hard." Compare Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah
1985) M
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98

(Utah 1985) .aM Synergetics v, Marathon Ranching Co,, ht&,,
701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) and Bundv v. Century Eouip. Co., 692
P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) M
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom,
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) a M Clavton v. Crossroads Eguio. Co.,
655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (all involving "hard- damages) with
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) and Cruz v.
Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) and Branch v. Western
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) and First Security
Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah
1982) (all involving largely "soft" damages).
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verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law" as
ground upon which a new trial may be granted. Utah R. Civ,
P. 59(a)(6). Generally, hard compensatory damages will be
either supported by the evidence or not.
While it may be appropriate generally to consider
hard compensatory damages under subsection (6), the case may
be different with soft compensatory damages, which constitute
a majority of the compensatory damages awarded in this case.
At times, those may more properly be addressed under the
"passion or prejudice" framework of rule 59(a)(5).
We note one final problem that could result from the
standard we articulate today, which gives considerable
deference to the trial court in passing on motions for new
trials based on a claim of damage excessiveness. We do not
wish to encourage parties who may try to bypass the trial
court by appealing an excessive damage award directly without
moving for a new trial and thus benefit from a less deferential standard on appeal. To avoid such an anomalous result,
and because of the highly subjective nature of appraisal
required in assessing the excessiveness of an award, we hold
that any challenge to an award based on its excessiveness
that is brought before an appellate court will be considered
under the same standard articulated today for reviewing trial
court decisions on motions for a new trial. If no new trial
motion was filed below, we will assume that the trial court
considered such a motion sua sponte under rule 59(d) 30 and
denied the motion.
The course we take today should produce sounder
decision making by trial and appellate courts. First, we
plainly fix the primary responsibility of reviewing the
amount of punitive damage awards on the court best equipped

30. Rule 59(d) provides that "the court of its own volition
may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have
granted a new trial on motion of a party." Utah R. Civ. P.
59(d). If no motion was filed below and the trial court did
not grant a motion sua sponte, the effect is the same as if
the trial court had considered and denied the motion. Thus,
it is reasonable for us to apply the same standard of review
for punitive damage awards whether they are on appeal from a
trial court's refusal to grant a new trial or on direct
appeal. We note, however, that we so hold with regard to
punitives only because of the highly subjective nature of
punitive damage awards. By so interpreting rule 59(d) with
regard to punitive damage awards, we do not intend to imply
that a similar interpretation of the rule will be given as it
relates to other types of damages or to other grounds upon
which new trials may be granted.

to perform such a review—the trial court.31 We make it
plain that the appellate court's role is to review the trial
court's new trial ruling rather than the jury's verdict
directly. Second, we give some context to the term
"excessive" in rule 59(a)(5) through the imposition of an
operatively presumptive ceiling, albeit a soft one. Finally,
through the requirement of an articulation of reasons for
sustaining or modifying damage awards, we establish a
mechanism for the further development of the law_. The
express consideration of the norms by which awardsr~are
determined will promote careful review by both trial and
appellate courts of the policies underlying punitive damages
and the facts pertinent to a vindication of those policies on
a case-by-case basis. See Report on Punitive Damages 13-15
(advocating a flexible formula based on the amount of
compensatory damages to determine the appropriate amount of
punitive damages). A sounder law of punitive damages should
result.
The trial court's order denying the motion for a new
trial on grounds that the punitive damage award was excessive
is vacated, and the motion is remanded to the trial court for
further consideration in light of this opinion. The judgment
against Fire Insurance is affirmed in all other respects.

31. Some may argue that allowing the trial court to consider
in the first instance the propriety of the jury€s award of
punitives and to reduce or increase the award if it deems
appropriate violates the plaintiff's right to trial by jury.
We certainly are not advocating that the trial court
substitute wholesale its own judgment for that of the jury.
See, e.g., Hancock v. Planned Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183,
185 (Utah 1990) (trial court has no discretion to grant new
trial absent showing of at least one circumstance in rule
59). Rather, we are recognizing that the trial judge is in a
better position to determine in the first instance the
appropriateness of the award.
Our holding today in no way results in the loss of a
plaintiff's right to a jury trial. A trial judge, in
proposing a remittitur or additur, only does so as an
alternative to granting a new trial. This is true because a
trial judge may only remit the damages if he or she finds them
excessive or add to them if he or she finds them
inadequate—which is one of the grounds for granting a new
trial. Thus, if a plaintiff does not want to accept the
proposed remittitur, he or she may elect to retry the matter.
In addition, as we have already pointed out, a trial
judge may not substitute judgment for the jury. Rather, the
judge must be able to articulate a reasonable basis for the
inappropriateness of the verdict. Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah
2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); Saltas v. Affleck. 99 Utah 381,
105 P.2d 176 (1941).
No. 880034

34

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:

(Concurring with Reservations)

I concur.but write to express my reservation about
some statements in the majority opinion as to when it is
appropriate for the trial court to grant a new trial on the
ground contained in Rule 59(a)(6), which is w [insufficiency
of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against law** I prefer not to express any opinion
as to the law governing the granting of a new trial when the
motion to grant is premised on that ground. This is because
Fire Insurance, in its motion for a new trial, in its
argument to the trial court at the hearing on its motion, and
in its brief and argument to this court, has relied only on
Rule 59(a)(5)/ which allows a new trial to be granted when
there has been *[e]xcessive or inadequate damages, appearing
to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice.*
The majority opinion correctly states and applies
the law governing this ground. We need not go further and
attempt to restate the law governing other grounds for a new
trial and examine, overrule, and criticize our cases arising
under those grounds, especially in brief footnotes.
I also refrain from expressing any opinion as to
whether a motion for a new trial which challenges an award of
"hard actual damages" is more appropriately brought under
Rule 59(a)(6). In addition, I fail to see how an appellant
could benefit by declining to move for a new trial but
instead appealing directly an excessive damage award. In
fact, there is an obvious disadvantage to that strategy.
Therefore, I do not think we need assume that the trial court
considered and denied a motion for a new trial sua soonte
under Rule 59(d)•

STEWART, Justice:

(Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part)

I agree with much of what the majority states about
the standards to be employed under Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah
?s

Rules of Civil Procedure, but I have reservations about
several points in the opinion concerning the trial and
appellate standards for dealing with motions for new trials,
and I disagree with the ultimate disposition of the punitive
damages issue, I concur in all other parts of the opinion.
The sole issue raised on appeal in this case with
respect to the award of punitive damages is that they were
"excessive" under Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 59(a) specifies seven grounds for^ranting a
new trial by a trial court. Subpart (5) provides that a trial
court may order a new trial if it finds that the jury returned
"excessive or inadequate damages" that appear "to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice." The
majority uses that contention of error as a springboard to
launch into a sweeping, and in some instances confusing,
discussion of the operation of Rule 59(a). In parts of the
discussion, it appears that the majority is defining standards
for all of Rule 59(a), but in other parts the majority seems
to address issues that arise only under subparts (5) and (6),
although the latter subpart is not before the Court and has
not been argued by the parties.
I think it appropriate to note that although a
verdict may be supported by some evidence, the trial court may
set that verdict aside under subpart (6) if the verdict is
against the manifest weight of the evidence so "that the trial
judge 'cannot in good conscience permit it to stand.1"
Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984) (quoting
Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 441, 326 P.2d 722, 726 (1958)
(Crockett, J., concurring)). See also Brown v. Johnson, 24
Utah 2d 388, 391, 472 P.2d 942, 944 (1970); Hyland v. St.
Mark's H O S P . , 19 Utah 2d 134, 137, 427 P.2d 736, 738 (1967);
Efco Distrib., Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 380, 412 P.2d
615, 617-18 (1966); Kino v. Union Pacific R.R., 117 Utah 40,
45-49, 212 P.2d 692, 695-96 (1949); 6A J. Moore & J. Lucas,

Moore's Federal Practice if 59.08[53 (1991).

in Goddard Vt

Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984), and Nelson v. Truiillo, 657
P.2d 730 (Utah 1982), we held that the standard of review on
appeal of an order granting a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) is
that the order will be sustained "if the record contains
•substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict
for the [moving party].' n 657 P.2d at 732 (quoting King v.
Union Pacific R.R., 117 Utah at 53, 212 P.2d at 698).
In dealing with the standard of review that an
appellate court should utilize in reviewing a trial court's
grant of a motion for a new trial, the majority states that
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078
(Utah 1985), is a case that has contributed to confusion with
respect to the proper standard because that case stated that a
"reviewing court will defer to a jury's damage award unless
the award indicates that the jury disregarded competent
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evidence . . . .w 701 P.2d at 1084. The majority then
asserts that if that statement purports to state the standard
of review by which an appellate court determines the propriety
of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial, it
is incorrect. The majority further states:
The statement can be read to mean that this
court reviews the jury's action directly,
when in reality we review the trial court's
action for an abuse of discretion* It is
this type of loosely worded standard which
has, over time, effectively confused the
appellate court's proper role in assessing
the merits of a rule 59 motion attacking a
jury verdict with that of the trial judge.
Ma j . op. at 21 (citation omitted).
The confusion that the majority finds is based on its
misreading of Bennion. There was no issue of the propriety of
the grant or denial of a new trial motion in Bennion.-*- This
Court was simply asked to review directly the validity of the
award of damages. Although Rule 59(a) was argued by the
appellant in Bennion as if it established standards for
reversing a verdict on appeal, there was no motion for a new
trial made in the trial court, and the issue before this Court
was the standard for reviewing a damage award directly on
appeal. In short, the majority's loose analysis is used to
argue that it is necessary to restate our case law because it
is inaccurate. I disagree.
Indeed, the majority contrives a strange, hypothetical
procedure to justify an inappropriate standard of appellate
review of punitive damage awards not reviewed by the trial
court on a motion for a new trial. The majority states that in
cases in which a motion for a new trial is not made and an
appeal is taken directly from the award of punitive damages, an
appellate court will assume that the trial court sua sponte
considered and denied a hypothetical motion. This hypothetical
motion and ruling is then made the basis for applying the same
standard of review in direct appellate review of an award of
punitive damages as is applied when a motion for a new trial is
actually made and denied by the trial court and that ruling is
then appealed. Such an approach is unnecessary and if
literally applied would lead to serious difficulties. After
assuming the hypothetical motion and a ruling by the trial
court denying it, an appellate court must then, according to
1. Although the majority notes this distinction in footnote
21, it does not explain how Bennion could be misread as to the
proper standard of review when considering the denial or grant
of a motion for a new trial when no such issue was before the
Court,

the majority, determine if the trial court would have abused
its discretion in denying the hypothetical motion.
Clearly, the proper approach is for an appellate court
to review the award of punitive damages straight-out in light
of the various factors set out in the majority opinion for
determining the reasonableness of punitive damages. Compare
Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1084, which states that to justify a new
trial for excessive damages under Rule 59(a)(5), the damage
award must be "clearly excessive on any rational view of the
evidence." Although that statement was not made in the context
of a punitive damage award, it is an appropriate standard to be
applied in light of the six relevant factors referred to by the
majority to be considered in determining the validity of a
punitive damage award. Applying usual appellate standards to
the review of a punitive damage award is altogether sound.
There is no reason to devise a fictional procedure to justify
an unnecessary and inappropriate result. Given the
difficulties, it is important to recognize that the majority's
view is strictly dictum. There was in fact a motion for a new
trial in this case.
The majority remands this case to the trial court for
the trial judge to state his reasons for sustaining the award
of punitive damages. In explaining the factors the trial judge
may examine, the majority opinion, in my view, unduly
emphasizes the relationship of the punitive damages to
compensatory damages. That relationship is certainly not
determinative, but is only one of many factors to be
considered. In the context of this case, it is significant
that our prior cases have not dealt with punitive damages
awarded against a multi-million dollar corporation. Of greater
significance than the relationship of the punitive and
compensatory damage awards are the other factors which have
been enumerated in our cases, such as the financial resources
of the defendant and the likelihood that a defendant will
continue its malicious conduct.
The defendant in this case argues that its net income
for the year of its misconduct was $23,000,000 and that a
$4,000,000 punitive damage award is exceptionally high compared
to its net income. The defendant does not state, however, that
the company's total assets are $723,468,116. Furthermore, the
evidence disclosed that there are four claims offices in Utah,
each handling four to five thousand claims per year. In
addition, scores of other offices located in the western United
States handle a similar number of claims. The defendant stated
at trial that the practices which it employed in this case were
sound business practices- Indeed, three of the defendant's
employees who testified at trial for the defendant stated that
they believed they had treated the Crookstons fairly. The
claims adjuster who committed the fraud, Clapperton, stated
that he felt good about what he did to the Crookstons. His
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record for improving company profits has apparently not been
overlooked in the corporation, because the defendant has twice
promoted him since his adjustment of the Crookston loss. He is
now the district claims manager supervising the adjustment of
all claims in northern Utah,
From the defendant's point of view, it certainly can
be argued that $4,000,000 punitive damages is excessive.
However, from a public policy point of view, the award is
justified. In the absence of punitive damages, th%-defendant
may well find that it is profitable to continue its illegal
conduct even though it may incur the cost of compensatory
damages from time to time. One may never know how many of the
thousands of claims handled in Utah and elsewhere by the
defendant have been subjected to the same kind of fraudulent
manipulation as occurred in this case, with devastating losses
to those who contracted in good faith. A $4,000,000 punitive
damage award can certainly have a salubrious effect in inducing
the defendant to bring its practices into harmony with common
moral conduct and accepted business ethics, to say nothing of
the requirements of the law.
All this, and much more justifying the punitive damage
award, is on record in this case. The issue was well-tried,
and the trial judge set out his views with some clarity,
although not with as much detail as the majority opinion
requires. In my view, since the relevant evidence is before
the Court and is sufficient to justify the award of punitive
damages, given the presumption of correctness that ought to
attach to the jury verdict, I would affirm the award and not
remand for further proceedings.
Finally, I agree that, as a general proposition,
requiring an articulation of the reasons for the granting of a
new trial by a trial court is sound policy. This Court said as
much in Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 386-87, 105 P.2d 176,
178 (1940). However, I think the rules which require trial
judges to explain the reasons for granting or not granting a
motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive punitive
damages should be expanded to awards that are within the
three-to-one ratio that the Court suggests presumptively
establishes reasonableness. A three-to-one punitive damage
award may, however, be devastating for an individual or
business entity with limited financial resources. I think all
punitive damage awards by a jury should be justified by the
trial court when there is a motion for a new trial based on the
ground of excessive punitive damages.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial
judge's denial of a new trial without further proceedings. I
also concur in the reservations expressed in Justice Howe's
opinion.
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